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Property lawyers are generally viewed as a serious lot, not prone to feverish bursts ofexcitement as we seek comfort and solace in established legal rules and precepts. In the
same way, property law disputes tend to have a fairly low profile and fail to capture the
public imagination in the same way as, for example, those involving criminal or human
rights law. Such apparent indifference might seem a little strange, given the centrality of
property in everyday human life and the significance which legal systems and individuals
attach to property rights. However, there is one issue which always inflames passions
amongst lawyers and non-lawyers alike: the acquisition of  land through the doctrine of
adverse possession, often described as ‘squatter’s rights’. No property-related topic is likely
to light up a radio show phone-in switchboard quite like squatting.1
Most, if  not all, legal systems allow one person to lay claim to another’s land, based on
uninterrupted possession over a period of  time.2 Adverse possession results in a trespassing
squatter becoming the ‘rightful’ owner of  property through what is initially a ‘wrongful’ act,
while the original owner has their title extinguished without any payment of  compensation
* The authors’ names are arranged alphabetically. We would both like to thank Professor Kieran McEvoy,
School of  Law, Queen’s University Belfast, for his comments on an earlier draft of  this article.
1 Though the right to defend one’s home against intruders (the so-called ‘batter a burglar’ debate) comes a close
second, given the media attention generated in England and Wales by recent judicial comments that burglars
shot by their victims while committing such crimes should not expect any sentencing leniency, and the
Conservative-led Coalition government’s proposals to allow householders to use disproportionate force in
certain circumstances: see M Evans and S Marsden, ‘“Expect to Be Shot if  You Burgle Gun Owners”, Judge
Warns Criminals’ The Telegraph (London, 26 September 2012); and N Watt and P Wintour, ‘Tories Go Back to
Basics on Right to Defend Home’ The Guardian (London, 9 October 2012). 
2 In most jurisdictions, the basic limitation period (i.e. the time within which the rightful owner can bring an
action to recover their land when it is being occupied by someone else) is set out in the relevant ‘statute of
limitations’. For example, in Northern Ireland, the Limitation  (NI) Order1989 stipulates a 12-year period for
actions to recover land and, in the Republic of  Ireland, a similar period is set out in the Statute of  Limitations
1957. The Land Registration Act 2002 in England and Wales stipulates a minimum 10-year period of
occupation alongside other procedural requirements which are noted briefly in part 3 of  this article. It is,
perhaps, not surprising that the greatest variance in limitation periods occurs throughout the USA, ranging
from three years in Texas, through to 10 years in states such as Alabama and Iowa, to 20 years in, for example,
Delaware and Maryland, and 30 or 60 years in Pennsylvania (depending on whether the land is cultivated or
uncultivated): for a full listing see S L Martin, ‘Adverse Possession: Practical Realities and an Unjust
Enrichment Standard’ (2008) 37 Real Estate Law Journal 133, text to fnn 32–64. 
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from the squatter (or from the state).3 Attitudes towards the doctrine range across the entire
spectrum, from laissez-faire notions of  rewarding initiative and promoting efficient land use
to more prevalent feelings of  outrage and incredulity that the law is effectively sanctioning
land theft. This article questions why adverse possession provokes such visceral reactions
and identifies a number of  inherent emotional paradoxes. Focusing on conventional,
domestic-type squattings,4 it draws on selected cases and academic literature from both
sides of  the Atlantic where the topic has been one of  increasing debate in recent years and
the core issues essentially the same. The article begins by examining why ownership of
property (and land in particular) creates such strong sentimental attachments within
Western societies5 and uses these instinctive human responses as a means of  deconstructing
the predominantly negative emotions surrounding adverse possession. It then goes on to
look at the range of  variables which influence our perceptions of  specific adverse
possession claims, such as the character of  the squatter, the level of  apparent wrongdoing
and the amount and type of  property at stake. Finally, the article considers how adverse
possession conflicts purport to be adjudicated in an emotional vacuum, yet both judges and
legislators have responded to the less palatable aspects of  the doctrine with an increasing
emphasis on owner protection – the recent criminalisation of  ‘residential’ squatting in
England and Wales6 providing a good illustration.
1 The emotional response to adverse possession
Adverse possession claims vary, from minor encroachments and innocent trespasses over
another’s property to larger-scale and/or deliberate instances of  land-taking. Various
rationales can be put forward for allowing the doctrine to operate,7 though three are often
cited in particular. First and foremost, adverse possession is part of  the general law of
limitations; it prevents ‘stale’ claims with all their evidential difficulties, potential for costly
litigation and capacity to upset continued reliance on the status quo.8 Secondly, the doctrine
validates disputed land titles where official ownership records do not match perceived
realities – an essential element of  any property law system in which possession is the root
of  title9 – and facilitates land transfers where physical and legal boundaries are 
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3 Thus, adverse possession has been described as ‘an anomalous instance of  maturing a wrong into a right
contrary to one of  the most fundamental axioms of  the law’: H W Ballentine, ‘Title by Adverse Possession’
(1918–19) 32 Harv L Rev 135, 135. See also K J Gray and S F Gray, Elements of  Land Law (5th edn, OUP
2009) 1159: ‘[T]he inception of  adverse possession brings about one of  the larger paradoxes of  the law of
realty – an uncompensated shift of  economic value to the squatter or interloper . . . Estate ownership is
fundamentally determined by behavioural fact rather than by documentary record.’
4 In other words, those between neighbouring landowners or homeowners, or between private individuals, as
opposed to larger scale, socio-economic or politically motivated squattings, which often occur as a form of
land reclamation within post-conflict states or those in a period of  transition: see, for example, S Moyo and
P Yeros (eds), Reclaiming the Land: The Resurgence of  Rural Movements in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Zed Books
2005).
5 While this is not an exclusively Western phenomenon, collective views of  landownership and the values
attached to it vary within different societies and are strongly influenced by socio-cultural factors. Thus,
Western constructs with their emphasis on private property and individualism will differ significantly from,
for example, indigenous concepts of  property and their emphasis on communal rights: see, generally, 
F W Rudmin, ‘Cross-Cultural Correlates of  the Ownership of  Private Property’ (1992) 21 Soc Sci Res 57.
6 Under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of  Offenders Act 2012: see part 3 below.
7 For an overview, see J E Stake, ‘The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession’ (2001) 89 Georgetown Law Journal
2419, 2434–55.
8 See T W Merill, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession’ (1984) 79 Northwestern University
L Rev 1122, at 1128.
9 See Merill (n 8) 1129–30; as well as Gray and Gray (n 3) 163.
misaligned.10 Thirdly, the threat of  squatting encourages landowners to be vigilant and can
be linked to broader notions of  social responsibility in promoting maximum use and
productivity of  a finite and valuable resource.11 Yet, such ostensibly legitimate aims are
irrelevant when it comes to the emotional reactions engendered by adverse possession and
the loss of  land which the doctrine facilitates. From the perspective of  the dispossessed
landowner, the primary emotions are often anger and disgust directed towards the squatter
– a figure frequently portrayed as a villainous bogeyman in the popular media and
elsewhere.12 Such negative feelings are hardly surprising, given that adverse possession taps
into key elements of  the human psyche.
At its most basic level, adverse possession tends to be viewed as nothing more than
‘theft or robbery, a primitive method of  acquiring land without paying for it’.13 The offence
of  theft itself  connotes morally repugnant notions of  someone taking something which
does not belong to them and violating the rights of  the property owner in doing so. Yet,
when the subject-matter is land, the stakes are raised significantly, not least because to steal
a person’s land is to steal not only their property but their territory – their ‘patch’.14 Western
societies are characterised by an overwhelming bias towards the concept of  private property
and ownership rights.15 Ownership of  property, and land in particular, is inextricably linked
with certain social and cultural values. Land is much more than a precious natural resource
which is vital for the sustenance of  mankind; it is a potent and socially recognised symbol
of  material wealth, identity, social standing and financial security for the owner.16 The old
mantra that ‘an Englishman’s home is his castle’ conjures up important notions of
dominion and control, with ownership conveying a sense of  ‘economic power, individual
self-meaning, and personal self-worth’.17 Adverse possession represents a direct attack on
these basic constructs and the feelings of  happiness, well-being and personal satisfaction
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10 For example, as a means of  rectifying previous conveyancing errors or resolving the classic boundary dispute
between neighbouring properties.
11 Stake (n 7) 2434–36.
12 For examples of  this, one need look no further than at the campaigns conducted by sections of  the popular
press in relation to the squatting controversies of  the 1970s, the hippy convoy of  1986, the Parliament Square
camp of  2010 and the Dale Farm evictions of  2012. These portray squatters as folk devils of  the very worst
sort; an articulated, sophisticated and ruthlessly organised army of  hippies, layabouts and drug addicts (many
of  them foreign) who lie in wait to take over your house as soon as you go on holiday and smash it up for the
sheer pleasure of  doing so. Their alleged aim is nothing less than the complete destruction of  civilised society:
see B Glastonbury and G Thompson, ‘Conspiracy, Criminal Law and Squatting’ (1976) 3 British Journal of
Law and Society 233; N Anning et al, Squatting: The Real Story (Bay Leaf  1980) ch 5; P Vincent-Jones, ‘Private
Property and Public Order: The Hippy Convoy and Criminal Trespass’ (1986) Journal of  Law and Society 343;
and P Scraton, Power, Conflict and Criminalisation (Routledge 2007) ch 1. 
13 Ballantine (n 3) 135; and see also Martin (n 2) 133, describing the doctrine as a ‘legal way to get something for
nothing’.
14 This notion of  territory is, of  course, something even animals recognise: see J Edney, ‘Human Territoriality’
(1974) 81 Psychological Bulletin 959; S N Brower ‘Territory in Urban Settings’ in I Altman et al, Environment
and Culture (Plenum Press 1980); and R D Sack, ‘Human Territoriality: A Theory’ (1983) 73 Annals of  the
Association of  American Geographers 55. 
15 See, generally, Rudmin (n 5).
16 See N Davidson, ‘Property and Relative Status’ (2009) 107 Mich L Rev 757; and L Bloom, ‘People and
Property: A Psychoanalytical View’ in F W Rudmin (ed), To Have Possessions: A Handbook on Ownership of
Property (Select Press 1991). 
17 R R Coletta, ‘The Measuring Stick of  Regulatory Takings: A Biological and Cultural Analysis’ (1998) 1
University of  Pennsylvania J Const L 20, 24. See also J T Powell, ‘The Psychological Cost of  Eminent Domain
Takings and Just Compensation’ (2006) 30 Law and Psychol Rev 215, 219 (property ownership is closely linked
to a person’s ‘identity and feelings of  well-being and security’); as well as M J Radin, ‘Property and
Personhood’ (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957.
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associated with ownership. Little wonder that the doctrine raises hackles and gets the
adrenaline pumping.
Psychological studies have established strong personal connections between individuals
and their material possessions, an innate sense of  ‘me’ and ‘mine’ that attaches to objects
and generates positive emotions of  the type just described.18 Such deeply rooted
predispositions are hardly surprising, given that evolutionary stable patterns of  behaviour
could not have developed without some means of  asserting control over finite commodities
and resources. However, individual connections to land are even stronger, not just because
of  a deep sense of  emotional attachment,19 but because every piece of  land is unique and
potentially irreplaceable. With this in mind, our instinctive responses to adverse possession
are hardly surprising. As Coletta has observed:
Biologically, ownership of  real property engenders a defined band of  emotional
attachments. Humans are conditioned to ground themselves in their physical
environment and to claim nearby space with a characteristic absoluteness. Strong
feelings surround this sense of  ownership and any attack on its inviolability
produces immediate outrage and defensive strategies. The idea that property is
one’s individual domain ‘feels’ correct. Ownership carries with it the sensations
of  stability, security and well-being.20
Physiological traits aside, the very concept of  land ownership generates certain shared
assumptions which also exert a strong influence on reactions to adverse possession.
Ownership and respect for ownership play an important part in how we relate to others,
and how we ‘imagine’ ourselves as part of  a broader collective community and a civilised
nation.21 Society expects individual citizens to respect the property rights of  others and to
act accordingly, in what might be described as a property-centric version of  the biblical
mantra to ‘do to others as you would have them do unto you’.22 As Rudmin puts it:
We know where our possessory interests and property rights reside and where they do
not. We limit our behaviour accordingly, and expect others to know and do the same.23
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18 For an excellent analysis, see J L Pierce, T Kostova and K T Dirks, ‘The State of  Psychological Ownership:
Integrating and Extending a Century of  Research’ (2002) 7 Review of  General Psychology 84; as well as 
J A Blumenthal, ‘Property Law: A Cognitive Turn’ (2010) 17 Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 186 and ‘“To
Be Human”: A Psychological Perspective on Property Law’ (2008–09) 83 Tul L Rev 609 and the various
sources cited therein. See also J E Stake, ‘The Property “Instinct”’ (2004) 359 Phil Transactions Royal Society
B 1763; and D B Barros, ‘The Biology of  Possession’ (2001) 20 Widener L J 291.
19 This idea of  emotional attachment has been well documented in the eminent domain or compulsory
acquisitions context: see Powell (n 17), the author making the point that, while property owners are often paid
the full market value of  their properties, compensation for loss of  emotional connections and (in some
instances) loss of  community are much more difficult to measure. See also E Sherwin, ‘Three Reasons Why
Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral Anxiety’ (2006–07) 48 Wm and Mary L Rev 1927, 1939, where the
author suggests that people build their lives and businesses ‘in the expectation of  control over a type and
quality of  resources’ and ‘endow their holdings psychologically’. 
20 Coletta (n 17) 72. Later in the same article, the author remarks: ‘Once I attach land as “mine”, my perspective
is in many ways predetermined by my biology: external interference with my dominion and control is
perceived as hostile and villainous’: 75.
21 See, for example, B Bowden, ‘The Ideal of  Civilisation: Its Origins and Socio-Political Character’ (2004) 7
Critical Review of  International Social and Political Philosophy 25, discussing inter alia the work of  Norbert
Elias (see N Elias, The Civilising Process (Blackwell Publishers 2000)).
22 Luke 6:31.
23 F W Rudmin, ‘“To Own is to be Perceived to Own”: A Social Cognitive Look at the Ownership of  Property’
(1991) 6 Journal of  Social Behaviour and Personality 85, 86. See also E M Peñalver and S Katyal, ‘Property
Outlaws’ (2007) 155 University of  Pennsylvania L Rev 101, 136 (‘property rights and the social norms that
accompany . . . property ownership play an important role in ordering our interactions with other human
beings’). 
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The sanctity of  land ownership creates reciprocal notions of  respect for property rights,
based on broader constructs of  social morality;24 interference with these rights by a squatter
is regarded as an immoral act, not just by the original owner but by the community at large.
Another important factor is the perceived role of  the state as both law maker and law
enforcer. Societal views of  adverse possession are shaped by an expectation that the law
provides strong (if  not impervious) protections for private property rights. Such rights are
subject to minimal state inference; they must be upheld and protected as one of  the
benchmarks of  a so-called ‘civilised’ society.25 Yet, in successful adverse possession claims,
the state (having passed the relevant statute of  limitations) allows a squatter to ‘take’ land
from the original owner and is effectively sanctioning theft while failing in its duty to protect
its citizens against what is perceived to be an unlawful appropriation by others.26 In short,
the role of  the state ‘adds insult to injury’, thus fuelling the collective sense of  anger and
injustice associated with the doctrine. According to Stake:
[Adverse possession] strikes at the heart of  our concept of  property. ‘Property’
means rights – rights in a thing, that are enforced by the state. We support state
enforcement of  rights in things for reasons of  both justice and efficiency. The
fundamental idea of  property is that it cannot be taken against the owner’s 
wishes . . . Yet that is what adverse possession does. The doctrine effects a
transfer of  state-sanctioned rights in land from owners to non-owners without
the consent of  the owner.27
Adverse possession disregards entitlement as the state effectively colludes with and
facilitates the squatter in appearing to reward egregious behaviour. Little surprise then that
the doctrine often prompts simultaneous feelings of  disgust, despair and disbelief  – all of
which contribute to the pervasive sense of  moral outrage.28 Meanwhile, the punitive
element of  the doctrine creates both confusion and a heightened sense of  unfairness. Other
areas of  law, such as criminal law and torts, generally punish only those who have
performed affirmative wrongful acts, or failed to act to avoid creating an unreasonable risk
of  harm. In contrast, adverse possession penalises landowners for inactivity that poses no
threat to others; failing to use or attend to their land results in ‘poor, unsuspecting, innocent
owners los[ing] all or part of  [it] . . . without having done anything wrong’.29 Of  course,
sentiments such as these reveal more than ingrained emotions; they speak to deeper societal
fears realised in the spectre of  a decent, law-abiding citizen who works hard, pays their taxes
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24 ‘[P]roperty rights command widespread respect. This respect can only be provided by some version of
morality that treats violations of  possession . . . and other gross interferences with property as wrongs subject
to widespread disapprobation’: T W Merill and H E Smith, ‘The Morality of  Property’ (2006–07) 48 Wm and
Mary L Rev 1849, 1852–53. See also R S Auchmuty, ‘Not Just a Good Children’s Story: A Tribute to Adverse
Possession’ [2004] Conv 68.
25 ‘Property rights . . . provide individual security and (in the process) diffuse political power. They create and
protect material wealth and prosperity, necessary preconditions for social civility, social stability, and the
maintenance of  democratic governance.’: L S Underkuffler, The Idea of  Property (OUP 2003) 138. The popular
image of  ownership as generating entitlements safeguarded by the state has also been enhanced by the rights-
based culture of  the latter twentieth century: see, for example, the protection of  property provision in art 1,
Protocol 1 of  the European Convention on Human Rights, and compare art 44 of  the Irish Constitution.
26 Of  course, the irony here is that adverse possession is perfectly lawful, assuming that the requisite conditions
have been met. This is discussed further below.
27 Stake (n 7) 2420. The author also makes the point later in the same article that: ‘if  land is part of  the self, its
reallocation by the state is akin to physical or mental punishment, which the state ought not be able to impose
without a finding of  criminal behaviour’: 2456.
28 See Peñalver and Katyal (n 23) 103: ‘The overwhelmingly negative view of  property lawbreakers in popular
consciousness comports with the centrality of  property rights within our characteristically individualist,
capitalist, political culture.’ 
29 Stake (n 7) 2434.
and obeys the rules, yet is still vulnerable (through no perceived fault of  their own) to
having their interests subordinated to those who fail to respect the rights of  others. And if
the law allows this to happen to one individual, what is to stop the same thing happening
to anyone else?
In contrast, advocates of  adverse possession would argue that it does nothing more than
reward the efforts and initiative of  squatters who maximise the use of  a finite and under-
utilised resource.30 At some basic level, the squatter’s labour contrasted with the
landowner’s disregard for their property justifies a shift in ownership to the former.
Psychological studies suggest that an association between a person and an object can
validate ownership claims because that object means more to the person who currently
possesses it and has invested their labour in it – in other words, a type of
investment–attachment theory which favours the possessing individual.31 Transferring title
in adverse possession claims rewards the squatter who appears to ‘value’ the land more
because of  an ostensibly greater and more contemporaneous physical, financial and
emotional investment in it,32 while also giving effect to alleged social assumptions about
who is the rightful owner based on the public appearance of  an association between the
squatter and the property in question.33 As regards the landowner, the punitive element of
adverse possession is entirely justified; ‘lazy’ owners who, through indifference, carelessness
or wilful neglect, fail to remove a squatter as the limitation period ticks slowly by deserve to
lose their property,34 or at least be prodded into some sort of  preventative action.35
This analysis suggests that adverse possession is nothing more than a form of  corrective
justice, premised on dual notions of  squatter investment and landowner culpability. Moreover,
labelling squatters as land thieves is fundamentally wrong, since such individuals are ‘doing
nothing more than knowingly employing the law’s own process for acquiring land’.36 Yet, such
views are not borne out in societal attitudes towards adverse possession and the basic
stereotypes which are often applied to squatters. As Merill and Smith have argued:
Someone who has deliberately taken the property of  another is simply a bad
person, and should not be rewarded for such behavior. The immorality of  the
original act of  deprivation trumps all considerations of  utility that can be argued
on the other side.37
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30 See the various sources cited immediately below. It could also be argued that, in using someone else’s land,
squatters are merely acting on a basic human instinct to acquire property, with evolutionary theory suggesting
that such instincts are derived from a basic competition for scarce or finite resources: see, generally, Stake (n 18). 
31 See, for example, Rudmin (n 23) and J K Beggan and E M Brown, ‘Association as a Psychological Justification
for Ownership’ (1994) 128 Journal of  Psychology 365.
32 L A Fennell, ‘Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse Possession’ (2006) 100 Northwestern
University L Rev 1037, 1064, highlights this idea of  ‘moving scarce resources into the hands of  those who
place the highest value on them’. See also the discussion in Peñalver and Katyal (n 23) 149.
33 ‘Active possession of  the land for an extended period takes precedence over the documented title to the 
land . . . [T]he law recognizes that the active social perception of  ownership is a higher order principle of
ownership than the archival memory of  ownership’: Rudmin (n 23) 92. See also O Friedman and K R Neary,
‘First Possession beyond the Law: Adults’ and Young Children’s Intuitions about Ownership’ (2008–09) 83
Tul L Rev 679. 
34 See J Netter, P Hersch and W Manson, ‘An Economic Analysis of  Adverse Possession Statutes (1986) 6
International Review of  Law and Economics 217, 219. 
35 See Stake (n 7) 2435.
36 Fennell (n 32) 1044.
37 Merill and Smith (n 24) 1876. See also Peñalver and Katyal (n 23) 156, the authors noting that in most cases
the ‘desire for the property of  another will be unworthy and unjustified, and society correctly responds to the
lawbreaker’s behavior by punishing her for her transgression’. 
In short, for most of  us, a legal doctrine cannot ‘turn a moral wrong into a right’.38 Adverse
possession rewards and facilitates conduct that society generally regards as a form of
wrongdoing; it provokes such overwhelmingly negative responses because it encourages
what is perceived to be morally and socially unacceptable behaviour, while promoting the
uncompensated loss of  a valuable commodity.39 In many instances, it appears, literally, to
add state-sanctioned legal insult to injury.
2 altering the emotional response: the influence of external factors?
Our instinctive reactions to adverse possession are also shaped by external factors, not least
of  which is the perceived identity or character of  the squatter. In this respect, much will
depend on whether or not such individuals are deemed to be guilty of  whole-scale
wrongdoing. We may be prepared to turn the proverbial ‘blind eye’ to boundary disputes or
minor encroachments and to tolerate the innocent, ‘good-faith’ squatter who unknowingly
trespasses on another’s land; such claims are, perhaps, more likely to produce an emotionally
neutral response. However, the same cannot usually be said of  the opportunistic, ‘bad-faith’
squatter who deliberately sets out to acquire land by adverse possession and acts in full
knowledge of  the landowner’s (initially) superior rights; here, the emotional response is
much more pronounced because of  an innate dislike for those who are contemptuous of
the rights of  others.40
One of  the most extreme examples of  this occurred several years ago in Boulder,
Colorado, in a dispute between two neighbouring landowners.41 The Kirlins had purchased
land in 1984, intending to build their ‘dream home’ there some day; the lot in question was
several blocks from the couple’s current home and directly beside property owned by
Richard McClean and his wife, Edith Stevens. For 25 years, McClean and Stevens used
around a third of  the Kirlins’ lot as a garden and as a means of  access to their own back
yard; they also stored wood on the lot and held various social gatherings there. When the
Kirlins realised what was happening (sometime in 2006), they started to fence a dividing line
between the two properties (i.e. theirs, and the one owned by McClean and Stevens) but
were prevented from doing so when McClean obtained a restraining order to stop the
fencing. McClean and Stevens then claimed that one-third of  the Kirlins’ lot was theirs by
adverse possession and were awarded title to part of  it in October 2007, provoking public
uproar. Hundreds of  people gathered to protest the court’s decision, while a barrage of
negative media commentary surrounding the case (and adverse possession more generally)
brought the matter to the attention of  the Colorado General Assembly.42 The result was
sweeping amendments to the law of  adverse possession in the state of  Colorado, making it
virtually impossible for a similar claim to succeed in the future.43
Public reactions to this particular dispute were so very pronounced for one reason: the
fact that McLean was a retired district court judge and former mayor of  Boulder and that
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38 Fennell (n 32) 1054. 
39 See, for example, Stake (n 7) 2433. 
40 ‘[T]he cases do clearly show that the trespasser who knows he is trespassing stands lower in the eyes of  the
law . . . than the trespasser who acts in honest belief  that he is simply occupying what is his already’: see 
R H Helmholz, ‘Adverse Possession and Subjective Intention’ (1983) 61 Washington University Law Quarterly
331, 332. 
41 McLean and Stevens v DK Trust and Kirlin, Boulder District Court Case No 06 CV 982 (filed 4 October 2006).
For a more detailed discussion, see Martin (n 2).
42 See the discussion in Martin (n 2), text to fnn 80–90, for public reactions to the decision and associated
reporting in the local media.
43 These amendments were rushed through in 2008 and are noted briefly in part 3 of  this article. 
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Stevens was a practising lawyer. The Kirlin case was not only an example of  deliberate ‘land
theft’; the conventional negative response to adverse possession was apparently amplified
because Stevens was someone who was expected to defend the rights of  others, while
McLean was someone whose career had centred on the administration of  justice and,
having occupied public office, was expected to adhere to basic standards of  honesty and
integrity. The fact that the couple’s actions were completely lawful was irrelevant; both were
castigated as shameful hypocrites who had abused their respective positions, and were
effectively labelled social pariahs.44 Public sympathies lay firmly with the Kirlins, as
seemingly upright citizens who had suffered a huge injustice and would no longer be able
to build their dream home given the loss of  part of  their land and the $400,000 in legal fees
spent contesting the dispute.
The amount of  land at stake and its value can also be a significant factor when it comes
to our reactions to adverse possession claims. Most are contested boundaries, involving fairly
small and relatively inexpensive parcels of  land. Yet, when we think about adverse possession,
our minds immediately conjure up images of  squatters seizing uninhabited homes or large
rural properties – something which effectively came to pass in the Kirlin dispute, and occurred
in even starker form in the English case of  J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham.45 Pye was a
development company which had purchased land in Berkshire in 1977; it included a large
estate comprising ‘Manor Farm’ and the 23 hectares (57 acres) of  land at the heart of  the
litigation (‘the disputed land’). Manor Farm was sold shortly afterwards and eventually bought
by the Graham family in 1982. Pye retained the disputed land, intending to develop it when
planning permission could be secured, but issuing grazing licences over it to the owners of
Manor Farm in the meantime. The Grahams had such a licence and, conscious of  the fact
that it would expire on 31 December 1983, contacted Pye asking if  the permission could be
renewed for another year. Pye refused, because of  an anticipated planning application.
Between December 1984 and May 1985, the Grahams made repeated requests to renew the
grazing licence, but received no reply. In the meantime, nothing changed – Pye never obtained
planning permission and had no further communications with the Grahams who continued
to farm the disputed land as before. This continued until June 1997 when the Grahams
claimed that the property was theirs by adverse possession. Pye subsequently issued
proceedings to reclaim its land; following a lengthy and protracted legal battle, the House of
Lords ruled in favour of  the Grahams resulting in Pye losing title to 23 hectares of  prime
agricultural land with development potential and an estimated value of  £10m.
Perhaps one of  the most surprising aspects of  the Pye litigation is that responses to the
decision were fairly muted; despite the amount of  land at stake and its value, there was none
of  the public outcry which the Kirlin dispute generated, and reports in the national media
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2007) <www.denverpost.com/harsanyi/ci_7501264> accessed November 2012. The same article also
suggests a certain pro-establishment bias in McClean being granted court orders by members of  the judiciary
with whom he once served. 
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between private individuals (without any socio-economic or political objective) and falls within the category
of  ‘domestic squattings’ being looked at in this article.
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were fairly anodyne despite the publicity generated by the case.46 The Grahams knew their
actions were wrong in the sense that they were not permitted to be on the land from 1984
onwards, and there is a certain counter-utilitarian aspect to the decision given that it resulted
in land which Pye intended to use for housing being placed into private ownership.
However, reactions were probably also influenced by the fact that Pye was a wealthy (and
faceless) corporation with an abundance of  land and was also in some way responsible for
what had happened by failing to remove the Grahams. In short, while people might find the
Grahams and their conscious ‘taking’ of  someone else’s property objectionable, they also
tend to have little sympathy for indifferent or neglectful landowners like Pye who fail to act
despite being fully aware that someone else is using their land. Indeed, such inaction is
perhaps viewed as evidence that they cannot have had a strong emotional attachment to it
in the first place.
Another significant difference between the Pye case and that involving the Kirlins is that
the former involved land intended for development rather than a private residence. Whilst
it may be true to say that people’s relationships with places generally are frequently
‘saturated with emotions’,47 this is doubly so in relation to a home. The concept of  ‘home’
has spawned a vast amount of  literature in recent years,48 much of  which serves to
emphasise the complex and multifaceted nature of  the idea.49 Thus, for Fox, the notion of
home connotes a physical structure, territory, identity and a social/cultural unit;50 for
Oluwole, it is at once heart, hearth, an area of  autonomy and a source of  social status.51 For
Gurney, the home is, for good or ill,52 nothing less than an ‘emotional warehouse’;53 for
Low these emotions can be not only ‘proactive’ ones such as love, warmth, trust and
security, but also ‘reactive’ ones associated with defensive feelings and a desire to be
protected from real or imagined dangers.54 The significance of  these feelings in the present
context is plain to see; taking someone’s home is so much worse than taking other property
because of  complex emotional attachments to the home and the sense of  shelter and
security that it connotes. In the two cases discussed here, Pye simply lost its land; the Kirlins
lost what was intended to be their perfect home in what was effectively a symbolic
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47 B M González, ‘Topophilia and Topophobia’ (2005) 8 Space and Culture 193.
48 S Mallett, ‘Understanding Home: A Critical Review of  the Literature’ (2004) 52 Sociological Review 62.
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‘Home and Homelessness’ in I Altman and C M Werner (eds), Home Environments (Plenum Press 1985) 34;
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Psycho-Social Benefits’ (2011) 19 Ife Psychologia; and D B Barros, ‘Home as a Legal Concept’ (2006) 46 Santa
Clara L Rev 255. For a more critical approach, see S Stern, ‘Residential Protection and the Legal Mythology
of  Home’ (2009) 107 Mich L Rev 1093. 
50 L Fox, ‘The Meaning of  Home’ (2002) 29 JLS 580, 590. 
51 Oluwole (n 49) 3.
52 Thus, many critics have suggested that romanticised ideals of  home are often at odds with the lived experience
of  many people, most notably those for whom it is a place not of  safety but of  terror: see Mallett (n 48). 
53 C Gurney, ‘Towards a more Affective Understanding of  Home’ in Proceedings of  Culture and Space in Built
Environments: Critical Directions/New Paradigms (2003) 33, as cited by Oluwole (n 49).
54 S F Low, ‘The New Emotions of  Home’ in M Sorkin (ed), Indefensible Space: The Architecture of  the National
Insecurity State (Routledge 2008) 233.
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shattering of  the core values of  the ‘American dream’: the concept of  private property and
protection of  basic rights and freedoms.
The decision in Pye aside, other high-profile squatting claims show that public reactions
can be just as strong in England as they are on the other side of  the Atlantic, especially
where the squatter’s actions are deliberate and the potential loss of  valuable property (often,
but not always, a home or private dwelling) creates a strong sense of  injustice.55 Such claims
are also characterised by a tendency on the part of  the media to vilify certain categories of
squatter, and not simply because of  their actions in claiming another person’s land; this
would be bad enough on its own, but the fact that the squatter is classed as a certain ‘type’
of  individual makes things even worse and heightens the emotional response. For example,
those who engage in organised squattings are frequently portrayed as ‘scruffy layabouts’,
scrounging off  the rich by moving into affluent neighbourhoods and occupying private
dwellings, or acquiring valuable council properties at the expense of  the taxpayer.56 Adverse
possession has also occasionally been linked to the immigration debate, with certain
newspapers suggesting that those who come to Britain from other countries are not simply
changing communities and threatening citizens’ livelihoods but are now ‘taking our homes’
as well.57 Although the likelihood that adverse possession will ripen into title is virtually nil
here, the association of  adverse possession with immigration, with all that this implies by
way of  broader societal fears and prejudices, makes it a much more contentious and divisive
issue than it might otherwise be.
3 Mediating the emotional response: judges, legislators and the shift towards
owner protection
Adverse possession is an example of  the capacity of  the law to generate negative emotion.
Yet, there appears to be little room for an emotional response to contested land claims, at
least insofar as the legal system itself  is concerned. This is hardly surprising. Property law
facilitates a dispassionate dialogue with its emphasis on rules and legal formalism, and the
resolution of  adverse possession disputes is no different. Mechanistic principles ignore such
things as the landowner’s sentimental attachment to the property or its financial worth; the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(1)
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57 See, for example, M Horsnell, ‘Polish Builders do up Flat, then Stay as Squatters’ The Times (London,
11 November 2006); C Gray, ‘How Migrants Snatched our Homes’ Daily Express (London, 23 September
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squatter’s motivations are also irrelevant, as is the sense of  outrage and injustice which any
successful claim might generate. However, this is not to say that courts have remained
entirely neutral in their views.
While the various statutes of  limitation stipulate a time after which a squatter can claim
title to another’s land, certain doctrinal requirements must also be satisfied such as exclusive
physical control over the land and intention to possess to the exclusion of  all others58 –
what might be described as a type of  ‘judicial gloss’ on the legislation. The application of
these rules does not tend to distinguish between so-called good-faith and bad-faith takings,
with the result that the ‘rapacious land-grabber is treated no differently to the innocent,
land-caring trespasser’.59 Yet there is a subjective tendency on the part of  judges to
categorise some adverse possession claims as less deserving than others and to raise the
legal threshold accordingly by making it more evidentially difficult for a squatter to prove
intention to possess or factual control of  the land, both of  which must be established on
the facts of  the individual case. In other words, by subtly manipulating the doctrinal
requirements of  adverse possession, judges can sometimes ensure that deliberate land
thieves, or those whose adverse possession claims appear to them to be less meritorious,
find it more difficult to succeed.60
We might describe this as an intuitive emotional response; instead of  simply applying
law to fact in a mechanical and deliberative way, judges may be swayed (in adverse
possession claims where they ensure that title remains with the owner) by certain biological
predispositions around notions of  property and ownership, and by the negative moral
connotations which squatting generates.61 As argued above, such factors strongly influence
societal responses to adverse possession,62 and judges are no different, even if  they can
justify a particular outcome on the basis of  legal rules as opposed to human intuition. It is
also interesting to note that judges do not tend to criticise individual squatters or make
negative comments about their actions, even where such persons are acting with blatant
disregard for the rights of  others.63 Once again, this is hardly surprising given that squatters
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58 These are the basic doctrinal requirements in English law, as established in cases such as Powell v McFarlane
(1977) 38 P & CR 452; Buckingham County Council v Moran [1990] Ch 623; and the House of  Lords decision in
JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419.
59 B Edgeworth, ‘Adverse Possession, Prescription and their Reform in Australia’ (2007) 15 APLJ 1, 15.
However, the position will obviously be different where adverse possession laws for a particular jurisdiction
specifically state that such a distinction should be made, as is now the case in the state of  Colorado: see text
to n 66.
60 Cooke notes a ‘recurring theme’ in English case law whereby judges ‘have at times appeared to strive to make
things difficult for the squatter by setting the [doctrinal] requirements . . . rather higher than they need be’: see
E Cooke, The New Law of  Land Registration (Hart Publishing 2003) 134 and the examples cited therein. Similar
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61 For an analysis of  the tensions between formalist and realist or intuitive models of  judging, see C Guthrie, J J
Rachlinski and Judge A J Wistrich, ‘Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases’ (2007) 93 Cornell L
Rev 1 and the various sources cited therein.
62 See part 1 above.
63 For example, in the Pye litigation, any negative expressions were confined to the outcome of  the case and
aspects of  adverse possession more generally with Lord Bingham and Lord Hope reluctantly awarding title to
the Grahams while criticising the absence of  any compensation mechanism for Pye as well as the ‘lack of
safeguards against oversight or inadvertence’ on the part of  the owner: JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1
AC 419, 447, per Lord Hope. It is worth noting here that Lord Bingham actually suggested that the Grahams
had ‘acted honourably throughout’ and were merely ‘doing what any farmer in their position would have done’
by continuing to farm the 23 hectares of  land when no new grazing agreement materialised ([2003] 1 AC 419
at 426). This perhaps embellishes things somewhat, given that the Grahams knew of  Pye’s superior right and
that their continued use of  the land was unauthorised and unpaid for!
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are merely taking advantage of  what the law allows them to do, and there are probably
numerous instances of  judges having to apply laws which they disagree with on a personal
level yet must uphold as a directive of  the state.64 Instead, manipulation of  the doctrinal
requirements for adverse possession can be seen as a discreet yet effective means of
channelling judicial empathy for disenfranchised landowners, while also signalling a tacit
disapproval for acts of  deliberate squatting.
Public attitudes towards adverse possession have also influenced legislative responses to
the doctrine, contributing to what we might describe as an increasingly ‘owner-protectionist’
stance in some jurisdictions. Law-makers have traditionally accepted (or tolerated) adverse
possession as a necessary means of  placing a time limit on lawsuits while ensuring that land
records match lived realities as a means of  promoting marketability. Yet, occasional high-
profile or atypical squatting cases (especially those which involve deliberate land-taking)
provoke public outrage and prompt calls for change, even if  they also distort the more
habitual application of  the doctrine. The strength of  the local reaction generated by the
Kirlin dispute in Colorado65 is a powerful example of  law responding to emotion, the
public’s instinctive aversion to the outcome and perceived immorality of  adverse possession
prompting a knee-jerk reaction which saw the state legislature rush through new laws within
a matter of  months. These reward only good-faith trespassers and allow courts to force a
victorious squatter to pay for any land acquired, as well as reimbursing the rightful owner
for any property taxes paid by them during the limitation period.66
In Britain, the driving forces behind recent changes to core adverse possession laws
have been more subtle though no less significant in their effect. Public perceptions of  the
doctrine undoubtedly played a part, given some of  the media headlines referred to earlier67
and the sense that it was becoming almost too easy for deliberate squatters to succeed.
However, other factors were also at play, in particular, arguments that adverse possession
did not sit comfortably with a system of  compulsory title registration and its definitive
record of  land ownership,68 as well as issues around whether an uncompensated loss of
land breached art 1, Protocol 1 of  the European Convention on Human Rights and its right
to ‘peaceful enjoyment of  possessions’.69 Existing adverse possession laws in England and
Wales ‘suddenly seemed, in popular imagination, to endorse a form of  land theft’,70
resulting in sweeping changes under the Land Registration Act 2002. Under this statute, a
squatter cannot simply succeed by occupying land for the limitation period; after a period
of  10 years, he must apply to the Land Registry to be registered as the proprietor of  the
land.71 The landowner will be alerted to the hostile claim and can object accordingly. At the
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65 See text to n 42.
66 See C D Joyce and A J Laydon, ‘Adverse Possession Claims in Colorado’ <www.fwlaw.com/
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69 Although the Grand Chamber of  the European Court of  Human Rights ultimately concluded that adverse
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70 Gray and Gray (n 3) 1166.
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risk of  over-simplification, the squatter will only succeed where certain exceptions apply –
for example, where he is entitled to the land under the doctrine of  estoppel or occupies the
land because of  a mistaken belief  as to its boundaries and ‘reasonably believed’ that the land
belonged to him.72 Like Colorado, the new laws in England and Wales suggest an
overwhelming shift towards protecting vulnerable owners, while the fact that bad-faith
squatters will have little chance of  success is perhaps indicative of  some sort of  legislative
intent to address the potential injustices caused by adverse possession.
A more recent salvo against squatting in England and Wales was unveiled by Prime
Minister David Cameron at a press conference on 21 June 2011, in which he announced a
range of  measures to be included in a raft of  criminal justice reforms being introduced that
day.73 One of  these was a new criminal offence of  squatting, to be brought into effect after
a short consultation exercise.74 These proposals came as something of  a surprise to MPs,
the Justice Secretary having said nothing about them in his statement to the House of
Commons that morning,75 and some disquiet was expressed from both sides of  the House
at this presentation of  important matters of  policy to the media before MPs had had a
chance to ask questions about them.76 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
Offenders Bill was duly given its first reading that afternoon,77 and its second reading the
following week,78 but it was not until the beginning of  November that the new provisions
on squatting were introduced, being inserted into the Bill during the course of  its report
stage.79 The effect of  these provisions, which can now be seen in s 144 of  the Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of  Offenders Act 2012, is to make it a criminal offence for a
person to be in a residential building as a trespasser having entered it as a trespasser, where
the person knows or ought to know that he or she is a trespasser, and is living in the building
or intends to live there for any period.80 The new offence is triable summarily and is
punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine of  up to £5000.81
Arguments around the state effectively underpinning the rights of  the property owner
seem intuitively strong; yet the purpose of  this new offence is by no means clear and, unlike
the Kirlin dispute in Colorado, there was no cause célèbre driving calls for legislative change.
In summing up the debate on the clause which preceded s 144, the Minister of  State declared
that it was wrong to steal someone else’s home and that the new provisions were intended
to address this,82 but at the end of  the day these provisions have little or no bearing on the
law of  adverse possession other than to strip it of  any notion of  state legitimacy in cases to
which the offence applies. As stated above, the acquisition of  title by adverse possession in
England and Wales had already been made virtually impossible (at least in the case of
registered land)83 by the Land Registration Act 2002. The real impact on adverse possession
doctrine comes from the 2002 Act, and in any event few if  any residential squatters of  the
sort contemplated by the new criminal law offence would ever have been likely to be allowed
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to remain in possession long enough to acquire title by these means. Nor does it do much to
improve the protection given to homeowners; as was pointed out on several occasions during
the parliamentary debates, s 7(1) of  the Criminal Law Act 1977 already makes it an offence
for a person who is on any premises as a trespasser, after having entered as such, to fail to
leave on being required to do so by or on behalf  of  a ‘displaced residential occupier’ of  those
premises.84 The consultation that preceded the enactment of  the new provisions was
somewhat perfunctory, and the responses received certainly did not indicate a major degree
of  public concern about the problem.85 All in all, it is hard to disagree with the comments
of  Sadiq Khan, the MP for Tooting,86 who suggested during the debate that the purpose of
these and other punitive provisions inserted into the Bill was to give a ‘tough’ appearance to
a piece of  legislation that might otherwise have been perceived as being somewhat ‘soft’ on
crime.87 To borrow from a well-known song from Mary Poppins,88 a spoonful of  sugar helps
the medicine go down in a most delightful way. Political symbolism aside, it is likely that the
criminal law sanction against squatting will resonate strongly with private citizens and be
viewed as a direct response by the state to the negative emotions generated by adverse
possession, thereby ensuring some level of  populist appeal.89
Conclusion
Despite its existence in most legal systems for centuries, adverse possession is an emotive
and divisive topic. The fact that reactions to the doctrine are so very visceral is hardly
surprising. Property and ownership are ingrained human traits in Western societies; the fact
that sentimental attachments to land tend to be even stronger, yet adverse possession allows
a squatter to take it from the owner with relative impunity, unleashes a sea of  hostile
feelings. In this respect, the sense of  state complicity only adds to the emotional maelstrom.
The present article has identified a number of  paradoxes surrounding adverse
possession and the emotions involved in it, be they on the part of  those involved in the
dispute, the wider public, the popular media, judges or legislators. The first paradox lies in
the doctrine itself; a wrong becomes a right, in that what was originally a tort committed
against the landowner becomes the basis of  the trespasser’s legal title. The second paradox
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lies in the emotional responses to adverse possession, which seem to be strongest in those
cases where there is little or no chance of  the doctrine ever coming into effect, as in cases
of  residential squatting where the owner is only too anxious to evict the adverse occupants
as soon as possible. The third paradox lies in the response of  judges and legislators which,
while not necessarily emotional in itself, may be motivated by the need to respond to and
to generate emotion on the part of  the public at large.
Of  course, some adverse possession claims are more defensible than others, depending
on how they are perceived and the influence of  certain factors, including the amount of
land involved and degree of  apparent culpability on the part of  the squatter. Yet, there is an
overwhelming sense in which adverse possession is morally and socially wrong, and that
laws which allow this to happen are unjust, unfair and in urgent need of  change. Judges are
limited in what they can achieve here, although recent legislative developments suggest that
law-makers have been influenced by contemporary community attitudes. By shifting the
emphasis firmly towards owner protection and more socially acceptable (or tolerable)
notions of  good-faith squatting, the law is responding to the negative emotions generated
by adverse possession. While crossing boundaries and acquiring someone else’s land
without compensation is never likely to receive widespread approbation, reducing its scope
may result in adverse possession being seen as less of  an affront to basic societal ideals.
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